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UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S. J. *
I. INTRODUCTION
A necessary condition for the development of the international
trade and investment so essential for the progress of underdeveloped
nations and for the continuing prosperity of more advanced nations
like those of the Common Market and the United States is the security
of property invested in foreign lands against such noncommercial risks
as discrimination and confiscation.
Over the years, as modern trade and investment began to develop,
international law evolved certain principles which bound nations to
safeguard the acquired property rights of foreigners, under the rubric
of "The Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens." These legal
rules provided by the law of nations clearly granted protection to the
acquired rights of foreign businessmen and, for their violation, the
receiving State was deemed delinquent and liable to reparation.
A recent change in the political climate of the world, however,
has had a substantial impact upon the security afforded foreign invest-
ment by traditional international law. Although this change has had
no effect in the Common Market area, it is well to take note of it in
order to clarify the present status of the law of State Responsibility.
With the emergence of new nations with strongly nationalistic
sentiments, the old alignment of colonial power and colony has largely
ceased to exist. These new States wish to take their places among the
nations of the world and, to that end, they desire to assume control
of the exploitation of their natural resources which had formerly been
at the disposition of the colonial powers. In many cases, however,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1942, M.A. 1947,
Boston College; LL.B. 1949, LL.M. 1951, Georgetown University; S.T.L. 1954, Weston
College; LL.M. 1956, S.J.D. 1963, Harvard University.
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the rights to these properties,are in the hands of foreign nationals who,
understandably enough, are not anxious to relinquish them and the
handsome profits which, in many cases, they entail,
Another potential source of trouble lies in the situation where
the newly independent nations are unable to ,carry out development
programs because of a lack of capital. Hence they must turn to the
older and more prosperous States for financial assistance. As a result,
the old alignment of colonial power and colony has been replaced by
that of capital-exporting State and capital-importing State. Naturally,
the investors from the capital-exporting nations want some return from
their outlay of capital, but their wish in this - regard has not always
been respected by the capital-importing nations.
This conflict of interests has. often marred the new relationship
between capital-exporting State and capital-importing State. Under
the influence of nationalistic sentiment, it is becoming increasingly
common for the governments of capital-importing nations to expro-
priate or nationalize—the various terms used to describe this proce-
dure do not seem to have any fixed meaning—the property of the
nationals of the capital-exporting nations. These actions are usually
complicated by the fact that the expropriating State is unable to com-
pensate the expropriated owners. Immediately, therefore, there arises
a clash between the property rights of the expropriated owners and
the rights to sovereignty of the expropriating nation.'
In some of the new nations, this political change has inevitably
resulted in the rejection of the rules developed to protect foreign invest-
ment. It is argued that these rules were evolved to further the aims
of colonialism and, today, do not qualify as international law. The
effect, of course, has been a reduction in the flow of investment capital
into these countries.
The American businessman who is contemplating expansion in
the Common Market, however, need not be wary of the effect of this
new attitude upon his investment. The attack on the traditional rules
of international law emanates from the under-deveIoped nations. None
of the European Common Market countries can properly be regarded
as under-developed. It seems clear, therefore, that traditional doctrine
which, as it evolved, applied to investment in developed and under-
developed nations, will continue to give protection to the acquired
rights of foreign businessmen in the Common Market countries.'
1 This conflict has continued without solution, as can be seen in the text of the
Dec. 14, 1962, Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on "Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources." U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 17th Sess., Plenary 1194
(A/Res/1803(XVII)) (1962), reprinted in 2 International Legal Materials 223 (1963).
2 The States of the Common Market, in keeping with the general practice of na-
tions, take customary international law into their municipal law and apply it, where ap-
propriate, to fulfill their international obligations. Sec, e.g., Seidl-Hohenveldern's com-
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It is true, of course, that in a civilized municipal society, consti-
tutional safeguards protect property rights. from arbitrary government
interference. The Common Market countries, as receiving States,
have provided such municipal law protection for trade and investment
from abroad. Municipal law protection, however substantial, does not
make security based upon international law rules superfluous. Govern-
ments can change or, at least, governmental policies can change, with
the resultant change in municipal law protection. Since the rules of
international law transcend domestic politics, they can offer more
substantial protection in certain circumstances.
It will be the purpose of this study, then, to set out, the rules of
customary international law which protect foreign property rights'
involved in peacetime international transactions. Some of these rules
are accepted unquestioningly; others are the subject of controversy.
But the decisions of tribunals, the practice of States, and the doctrinal
writings seem ample enough to spell out ,authoritatively the require-
ments of the law of nations in this matter.
Properly included in this consideration of the legal rules based
upon the consensus of the nations of the world is the question of the
remedy to satisfy a claim in damages for the taking of alien property
in violation of these rules.
It is hoped, thereby, that a clearer picture of the role of the law
of nations in the protection of international business transactions will
emerge. With this information the American businessman, planning
his Common Market operations, can proceed with greater certainty
that his property rights will not be jeopardized by arbitrary govern-
,
mental action.
II. THE TREATY PROTECTION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY
A. The Pacta Sunt Servanda Principle
One of the rules of international law, which is calculated to pro-
tect alien property interests from arbitrary seizure, states that pacta
parative study of the impact of international law upon the legal systems of France,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Transformation or Adoption
of International Law into Municipal Law, 12 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 88 (1963).
3 The meaning of the term "property rights" both in international law and for the
purposes of this study may be stated as follows:
According to a great array of diplomatic and judicial cases and the great ma-
jority of authors, it comprises rights as well as tangible property, above all
contractual rights, such as rights arising from contracts of concession, purchases,
loans, etc.
Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 243, 244-45 (1941). That
modern international practice relating to claims for compensation and restitution thus
admits of a broad definition of property is seen in the following treaty provision which
is typical: Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947, art. 78(9)(c) reads:
"Property" means all movable or immovable property, whether tangible or in-
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sunt servanda. This principle dictates that a State is bound, in good
faith, to carry out its treaty obligations.
Since the pacta sunt servanda rule is universally upheld, 4 no one
contests the proposition that a State must observe its treaty obligations
with regard to the property interests of foreigners. The Permanent
Court of International Justice, in the Chorzow Factory case, ruled
that the taking of alien property in contravention of a treaty was
"unlawful" and "illegal."' This ruling by the Court was a wholly
natural one, because the pacta sunt servanda principle obtains gener-
ally, in so far as it pertains to treaties, in the various areas of the law
of nations. And the Court also pointed out, in its Judgment Number 8
in the ChorzOw Factory case, that the violation of a treaty protecting
alien property entails the duty to make reparation for the damage
which has been incurred.
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an
adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable
complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.'
The pacta sunt servanda rule, therefore, protects alien property
interests, and the violation of that rule, with regard to alien property,
provides the basis for an international claim. And, as shall be shown
directly, international law dictates that reparation, in these circum-
stances, must take the form of restitution in kind, if possible.
B. The Taking of Foreign Property in Contravention of a Treaty
International law precedents for restitution are very rare.? There
is solid authority, however, for a decree of restitution when the taking
of alien property contravenes treaty prescriptions.
The principal basis for restitution, in these circumstances, is
tangible, including industrial, literary and artistic property, as well as all rights
or interests of any kind in property.. • .
61 Stat. 1245, 1406, T.I.A.S, No. 1648, See Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Prop-
erty under International Law?, 38 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 307 (1964).
4 The Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties states:
No case is known in which any tribunal ever repudiated the rule or questioned
its validity.
29 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 977 (1935).
5
 P.C.I.J., Ser., A, No. 17, at 47 (1928). See infra, part II(B). See also the case
Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7, at
21 (1926). The publicists reach the same conclusion. See Herz, supra note 3, at 253-54;
Fachiri, Expropriation and International Law, 1925 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 159, 169; Williams,
International Law and the Property of Aliens, 1928 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1, 28 (1928).
6
 P.C.I.J., Ser, A, No. 9, at 21 (1927).
7
 Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice 573
(1938); Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions 291 (1935).
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found in the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice in the ChorzOw Factory case. This case arose because of a protest
by Germany of the seizure by Poland of the industrial property of
certain German nationals in Polish Upper Silesia, in contravention
of the Geneva Convention of May 15, 1922, which had been concluded
to protect these interests.'
The Court found that the application of the Polish expropriation
law was not compatible with the guarantees established by the conven-
tion.' In its later indemnity judgment, the Court considered the nature
of the reparation due from Poland in consequence of her taking the
property of German nationals in violation of the prescriptions of the
treaty."
The Court found that the payment of the just price of the seized
property would not compensate the German Government for the
"wrongful act" of the Polish Government, since the latter did not have
the right to expropriate the property in question. The instant case was
one not of "lawful liquidation" but of "unlawful dispossession.""
Since the Polish Government had effected an "unlawful disposses-
sion," the compensation was to be determined by the principles which
govern reparation for an action contrary to international law. These
principles indicate that restitution in kind, if possible, is the compensa-
tion due for an act of this nature." The primary obligation of the
Polish Government, therefore, was to make restitution.
The dispossession of an industrial undertaking—the expro-
priation of which is prohibited by the Geneva Convention—
then involves the obligation to restore the undertaking and,
if this is not possible, to pay its value at the time of the
indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of
restitution which has become impossible."
8 16 Martens, Nouveau Recueil General de Traites 645 (3d sir. 1927).
o P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7, supra note 5, at 19-25.
11 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 17, supra note 5.
11 Id. at 46-47.
12 The Court enunciated this principle as follows:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act—a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in par-
ticular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals—is that reparation must, as far as
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award,
if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitu-
tion in kind or payment in place of it—such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to in-
ternational law.
Id. at 47.
13
 Id. at 47-48.
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Since, however, the parties had agreed on the impossibility of restoring
the factory, the Court ruled that payment of the value was to be the
reparation."
The rationale for the Court's position with regard to the remedy
of restitution is not self-evident. The Court did not discuss the ques-
tion explicitly, but an examination of its remarks, concerning the
principles for the determination of due compensation, seems to point
out the logical basis for the finding.
The reason seems to be the nature of the case itself. .The object
of any suit in damages is, as far as possible, to place the claimant in
the position he occupied before the tortious act—to place the claimant
in statu quo ante. Ordinarily, when treaty obligations are not involved,
a .foreign proprietor understands that he retains his property subject
to the host country's right of eminent domain. When foreign property
is taken through the exercise of the State's right of expropriation, "the
payment of fair compensation" is all that is required to render it law-
ful, as the Court pointed out."
But when a State promises by treaty to respect alien property
rights to accomplish some specific purpose—a purpose so important
that its effectuation is, entrusted to a treaty with its formalities and
safeguards—it engages its good faith to keep its part of the agreement.
This is precisely what Poland did when she signed the Geneva Con-
vention, "the object of which is to .provide for the maintenance of
economic life in Upper Silesia on the basis of respect for the status
quo.'"8
Poland's agreement; therefore, fell within the ambit of the cardinal
rule of international law, pacta sunt servanda. The payment of -mone-
tary compensation. .thus would not "provide for the maintenance of
economic 'life in Upper, Silesia;" other things being equal, restitution
alone was capable of restoring the proper status quo ante.
Hence, the measure of damages, in an expropriation case involving
treaty obligations, is determined by the nature of the obligation. This
means that property must be restored, if possible, if it has been taken
in violation of a treaty promise."•
Precedents for restitution under peacetime conditions are ad-
mittedly rare. There is agreement, however, that sufficient evidence
exists to support the proposition that customary international law
14 Id. at 48.
15 Id. at 46-47.
15 Id. at 47.
17 The Dospath-Dagh Company case, an arbitration between Greece and Bulgaria,
also supports the conclusion that restitution is the proper mode of reparation for taking
alien property in violation of an express treaty prohibition. 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1405 (1949).
See also the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
German Settlers in Poland case. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 6 (1923).
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prescribes restitution, if possible, as the proper remedy for the peace=
time taking of alien property in violation of an express treaty pro-
hibition.'
American nationals, therefore, whose European properties are
damaged in contravention of treaty obligations,' may seek restitution
in kind in lieu of an award of monetary compensation. When, however;
there has been a change in circumstances—for example, a deterioration
in the condition of the property—reparation can be effected by way
of •money damages.
ITT. THE WRONGFUL TAKING OF FOREIGN PROPERTY NOT
PROTECTED BY A TREATY
Very often, of course, an alien and his property 'are not protected
by a treaty. Respect for private property, however, is one of the sub-
stantive principles of the law of nations, and international tribunals
have ruled that the security of the private property and of the acquired
rights of aliens constitutes one of the general legal rules recognized by
international law.' International law, consequently, has formulated
several specific rules to protect these property interests from arbitrary
seizure. With these rules it is possible, to determine whether the taking
of alien property is wrongful and . furnishes grounds for a claim for
reparation, even though there, is no treaty protection.
A. The Prin. ciple of Non-Discrimination
This principle of international law states that alien-owned prop-
erty must not be the object of discriminatory legislation; that is, the
18 See Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for InjUries to the Economic In-
terests of Aliens, 55 Am, J. Int'l L. 545, 556-57 (1961).
19 One of the current projects for broadening the treaty protection of foreign in-
vestments is the 1962 draft multinational Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.),
reprinted in 2 International Legal Materials 241 (1963)• For an analysis of this Con-
vention see van Emde Boas, The O.E.C.D. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property, 1 Common Market L. Rev. 265 (1963).
20 See L'Affaire Goldenberg (Rumania v. Germany), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 901, 909 (1949).
Respect for private property rights is an indispensable rule of all Jaw, national and
international, for the right to private property is, generally speaking, essential to the
well-being and development of all peoples. Rapporteur Huber puts this well in the
British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (Great Britain v. Spain) Arbitration,
2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 615, 641 (1949):
On the other hand, it is unquestionable that, up to a certain point, the in-
terest of the State in being able to protect its nationals and their property must
carry more weight than respect for territorial sovereignty, even in the absence
of conventional obligations. This right of intervention has been claimed by all
States: only its limitations can be the subject of discussion. Denial of this right
would lead to inadmissible consequences: international law would be rendered
helpless in the face of injustice amounting to a negation of human personality;
for all denial of justice comes back to that.
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legislation authorizing the seizure of property must affect aliens and
nationals alike. 2 '
In addition to cases of discriminatory expropriation based upon
nationality, there have also been many instances of confiscation of alien
property on racial grounds, such as those perpetrated by Nazi Ger-
many before and during World War II. This latter form of discrimina-
tion has also been condemned by the courts as being violative of the
precepts of international law."
The prohibition against discrimination could conceivably lose
much of its significance as a means of protecting the property interests
of foreigners, since seizure decrees are often couched in general terms
to include both aliens and nationals. Granted that the expropriation
law is verbally non-discriminatory, what protection does the alien
owner have when, de facto, the property affected is entirely alien
owned?
The Permanent Court of International Justice answered this
question in its advisory opinion of February 4, 1932, in the Treatment
of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in
the Danzig Territory case.'
[The prohibition against discrimination, in order to be effec-
tive, must ensure the absence of discrimination in fact as well
as in Iaw. A measure which in terms is of general application,
but in fact is directed against Polish nationals and other per-
sons of Polish origin or speech, constitutes a violation of the
prohibition. A similar view has already been expressed by the
Court in its Advisory Opinion No. 6 relating to German set-
tlers in Poland. Whether a measure is or is not in fact
directed against these persons is a question to be decided on
the merits of each particular case. No hard and fast rule can
be laid down.24
21 U.N. International Law Comm'n, Report: International Responsibility, 9th Sess.,
at 42-46 (Doc. No. A/CN.4/106) (1957); Bindschedler, La Protection de la Propriete
Priv& en Droit International Public, 90 Hague Recueil 179, 186-207 (1956) (II) ; Fachiri,
supra note 5, at 160; Williams, supra note 5, at 28. See also the Chinn case, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934), where the Permanent Court of International Justice, although
finding that Belgium had not discriminated against the transportation company of a
British national in the Congo, upheld the international law prohibition against dis-
crimination.
The form of discrimination which is forbidden is therefore discrimination
based upon nationality and involving differential treatment by reason of their
nationality as between persons belonging to different national groups.
Id. at 87.
22
 See Hollart v. Moravia, France, 1949, Lauterpacht, Annual Dig., 1949, Case No.
7; Jellinek v. Levy, France, 1940, Lauterpacht, Annual Dig., 1919-1942 (supp. vol.),
Case No. 12.
23
 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 44 (1932).
24
 Id. at 28.
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The rule which prohibits the discriminatory taking of alien
property is, therefore, a principle of customary international law,
and it has been embodied in conventions. It is, indeed, a principle
of universal application, and it is found in the municipal law of all
civilized nations. It follows, therefore, that a discriminatory taking is
unlawful, and would furnish grounds for a claim for reparation for an
American businessman who might be subjected to such unequal treat-
ment in his European business transactions.
B. The Public Purpose Principle
Another rule of international law, which is aimed at protecting
alien property from arbitrary seizure, is the principle that the taking of
alien property must be for a public purpose or, as it is often enunciated,
for the purpose of public utility.
The Permanent Court of International Justice observed, in the
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, that generally accepted
international law permits the expropriation of property belonging to
foreigners for reasons of public utility.25
More specificity is given to the public purpose principle in the
Walter Fletcher Smith case, where the taking of alien property for
private profit was ruled contrary to international law. In this case,
real property, belonging to an American national and situated in Cuba,
was subjected to expropriation proceedings by Cuban municipal offi-
cials for the benefit of a private company. In the arbitration which
followed between the United States and Cuba, the latter claimed that
the expropriation was effected for reasons of public utility. The arbi-
trator found, however, that such was not the case. He ruled that while
the condemnation proceedings were municipal in form, the seized
property was turned over immediately to the private company in
question, ostensibly for public purposes, but, in fact, to be used by
the company for purposes of amusement and private profit, without
any reference to public utility. He concluded, therefore, that the
expropriation was illega1. 243
The publicists, also, generally insist upon the operation of the
25 P.C.I.J., Ser, A, No. 7, supra note 5, at 22.
2fl 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 913, 917-18 (1949). See also the Norwegian Shipowners Claims
case, 1 U.N.R.LA.A. 307, 334 (1948) and Jellinek v. Levy, supra note 22, at 24. In these
two cases the courts based the prohibition of the expropriation of alien property, except
in the public interest, on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
French public policy, respectively. These particular sources of protection belong to the
realm of municipal law but they are indicative of the general practice of States in the
matter of safeguarding alien property rights. We have, therefore, from this general prac-
tice of States, a further affirmation of the rule of customary international law which
states that the taking of alien property, not demanded by the public interest, is wrongful.
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public utility principle in the area -of alien property interests.' There
are some dissenters, however.' In support of the latter position, it
shoilld be noted that the criterion of public utility can fail to be of
real significance as a standard in judging the legality of an expropria-
tion, because of the modus operandi of some States in this area. For,
as has been observed, "if the legislature has the sole power to determine
what is for the public benefit, . . . questions of motive or inducement
become immaterial for all praclical purposes.'
A reasonable argument can be made in support of the more
common view, namely, that international law requires that the taking
of alien property be for a public purpose. A State, it may be argued,
can legitimately limit the entrance of aliens into its territory, and it
can place restrictions upon the property which aliens can take. But
once an alien has met these requirements, the alien has the right to
the expectation that he will be free from arbitrary expropriation,
albeit with compensation. The fact remains, however, that there does
not seem to be any case, involving the taking of alien property which
is not for a public purpose, which grants a remedy other than the
damages which would have been paid if the taking had been for a
public purpose. It seems fair to say, then, that the utility of the
public purpose rule is questionable.
C. The Principle of Full Compensation
Customary international law also states that the taking of alien
property must be fairly compensated for. The more exact rendition of
this rule is that the taking of alien property must be accompanied
by "adequate, effective, and prompt payment."" This rule is the
one most frequently involved in testing the legality of an expropria-
tion; and where its requirements are not complied' with, the taking
of alien property is judged to be confiscatory.
This rule, too, is the one about which one finds the most serious
controversy—whether general legislative reform measures (as distin-
guished from the usual eminent domain situation) to establish a better
economic or social order, when applied to aliens and nationals alike,
need to provide for full compensation for expropriated property. The
evidence does not seem to allow a definitive answer to this question.
The difficulty in this matter is being emphasized more and more
27 U.N. International Law Comm'n, supra note 21, at 42-46; Bindschedler, supra
note 21, at 186-207; Fachiri, supra note 21, at 169-70.
28 See, e.g., Herz, supra note 3, at 253.
29
 Kuhn, The Mexican Supreme Court Decision in the Oil Companies Expropriation
Cases, 34 Am, J. Intl L. 297, 299 (1940).
39
 From the note of Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican Government, Aug. 22,
1938, in the controversy over the Mexican expropriation of American agrarian and oil
properties, quoted in 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 658 (1942).
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today, with the emergence of the former colonial areas into the status
of full-fledged independent States. These newly independent States,
when taking alien-owned property in the execution of a general reform
program, have generally relied upon the "equality-of-treatment" or
"non-discrimination" doctrine, which states that international law
requires a State to accord to aliens the same treatment which it gives
to its own nationals, and no better." The capital-exporting States
interposing on behalf of their nationals whose property has been
expropriated without compensation have, on the other hand, insisted
on the "minimum standard" principle, which obliges a State to grant
a minimum of protection to aliens lawfully within its borders, regard-
less of the treatment given to its own nationals.'
A realistic appraisal of this problem indicates that international
law as it is currently conceived to be—that is, that body of rules based
on the concurrence of the wills of the several sovereign States—cannot
supply a generally approved rule to regulate the situations created by
expropriation legislation of general application.
The conclusion must be, therefore, that this question will remain,
for the time being, a political one. An expropriation of alien property
which is discriminatory in its effect, or without any reference to public
utility, engages the international responsibility of the expropriating
State. But it cannot be said that a general, non-discriminatory, public-
purpose taking does so, even if full compensation has not been paid.
There is no need to discuss this disputed question any further,
in as much as it is the purpose of this study to state the international
law subscribed to by the Common Market nations. As capital-exporting
States, these nations endorse the full compensation principle. It is in
order, therefore, to explore in more detail the protection afforded the
American businessman in his foreign business transactions by the full
compensation rule.
31 See the Czechoslovak Agrarian Reform (German Subjects) case, Czechoslovakia,
1925, McNair & Lauterpacht, Annual Dig., 1925-1926, Case No. 98. This case involved
the expropriation of large tracts of property to effect an agrarian reform program. The
law authorizing the seizure fixed the compensation at less than the actual market value
of the estates. In ruling against a German national's claim for full compensation, the
court stated that the purpose of the expropriation was, as regards German nationals, the
same as for the Czechoslovak nationals' property; namely, to regulate internal agrarian
conditions in harmony with the requirements of social justice. The court concluded
that there was no principle of international law which bound a State to grant more
favorable treatment to alien immovable property than that accorded to the State's own
nationals. In any event the international law on this question was of a controversial
nature, while the principle that the lex rei sitae governed immovable property was
universally recognized. Id. at 134-35.
32 See the argument of the United States Government presented by Secretary of
State Hull in his correspondence with the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs in the
controversy over the Mexican expropriation of American oil and agrarian properties. 3
Hackworth, supra note 30, at 657-60.
401
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Various arbitral tribunals have affirmed the principle that the
expropriation of alien property requires just compensation. The Nor-
wegian Shipowners Claims (Norway v. United States) case" involved
a claim for compensation by Norwegian shipowners, as reparation for
the seizure, without payment, of their contracts by the United States
Government during World War I. The Tribunal of Arbitration, in its
award of October 13, 1922, found that the United States had violated
the respect for alien property sanctioned by municipal and interna-
tional law. After ruling that "in the exercise of eminent domain the
right of friendly alien property must always be fully respected,"" the
court continued:
It is common ground that, in the absence of any treaty, the
Norwegian owners of these contracts were protected by the
fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States
against any expropriation not necessary for public use, and
that they are entitled to just compensation if expropriation
occurs.. .. Whether the action of the United States was law-
ful or not, just compensation is due to the claimants under
the municipal law of the United States, as well as under the
international Iaw, based upon the respect for private prop-
erty."
The full compensation requirement has been incorporated into
various commercial treaties, including those in force between the
United States and the Common Market nations." The authors, too,
generally require compensation for the expropriation of foreign prop-
erty."
33 Supra note 26.
34 Id. at 332.
35
 Id. at 334. The De Sabla (United States v. Panama) case, decided by the United
States-Panama General Claims Commission established in pursuance of the General
Claims Convention of July 28, 1926, and the Supplemental Convention of Dec. 17, 1932,
gives striking support to the "expropriation demands compensation" rule of international
law. In granting an indemnity in a claim for damages for violations of a foreign owner's
title to land in Panama, the Commission stated:
It is axiomatic that acts of a government in depriving an alien of his property
without compensation impose international responsibility. . . . It is no extreme
measure to hold, as this Commission does, that if the process of working out the
system results in the loss of the private property of aliens, such loss should be
compensated.
6 U.N.R.I.A.A. 358, 366 (1955).
3g See, e.g., the following treaties: Treaty With Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. V, 63(2)
Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty With the Netherlands, March 27, 1956, art. VI(4),
[1957]2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty With the Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, art. V, [195612 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
37 Nielsen, International Law Applied to Reclamations 39 (1933). See also Feller,
supra note 7, at 133; Freeman, supra note 7, at 517-18; 2 Whiteman, Damages in In-
ternational Law 1386 (1937); Fachiri, supra note 5, at 169-70; Hyde, Confiscatory Ex-
propriation, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 759, 760-61 (1938); Kaeckenbeeck, The Protection of
402
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY
Two further points should be made in this consideration of the
compensation principle. Although the decisions and the publicists
are primarily concerned with the guarantee of "full" compensation,
there are two other important factors relating to compensation, namely,
"prompt" and "effective" payment. Traditional doctrine sees these
factors as reasonable corollaries of the "full" compensation rule."
The recent practice, however, of accepting lump-sum settlements with
deferred payments after takings' ° calls into question the insistence
upon the "prompt" compensation formula as a rule of customary inter-
national law. Similarly, there is evidence that customary international
law recognizes the right of host States, through convertibility and
foreign exchange regulations, to pay compensation in local currency,
even though, traditionally, the "effective" compensation rule has meant
payment in the currency of the State of which the injured alien was
a national."
It is submitted, however, that recent instances of postponed pay-
ment and foreign exchange restrictions pose no real problem for Ameri-
can business operations in the Common Market. The capital-exporting
States in this institution subscribe to the legal rules which prohibit
unjust enrichment and demand respect for acquired rights. These
principles provide the rationale for the full compensation rule.
The concept of unjust enrichment is found in both civil and
Anglo-American law.4 ' It is also found in international law.' The
prohibition of the wrongful deprivation of private property, embodied
in the concept of unjust enrichment, finds further support in the inter-
national law rule which commands respect for acquired rights.'
The Common Market nations, then, in common with other civi-
lized societies, accept the inviolability of the rights of private property.
This means that Americans doing business in these countries may rely
Vested Rights in International Law, 17 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1, 16 (1936) ; Shawcross, The
Problems of Foreign Investment in International Law, 102 Hague Recucil 336, 344-46
(1961) (I).
38 See, e.g., Shawcross, supra note 37, at 345-46.
39 For example, the United States recently agreed to such a settlement providing for
payment over a twenty-year period. See Agreement With Poland Regarding Claims of
Nationals of the United States, July 16, 1960, I196012 U.S.T. 0.I.A. 1953, T.I.A.S. No.
4545.
40 See Metzger, Property in International Law, 50 Va. L, Rev. 594, 603-07 (1964);
A.B.A. Rep., Comm. on Int'l Trade and Investment, Section of Intl and Comp. L., The
Protection of Private Property Invested Abroad 79-81 (1963).
41 See Dawson, Unjust Enrichment passim (1951).
43 See Lena Goldfields Arbitration, 36 Cornell L.Q. 42 (1950-51) ; Landreau Claim
(United States v. Peru), 1 U.N.R.I.AA. 347 (1948).
43 See case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, supra note
5; Public Prosecutor v. Aerts, Tangier, 1939, Lauterpacht, Annual Dig., 1938-1940, Case
No. 23. See also Verdross, Les Regles Internationales Concernant le Traitement des
Strangers, 37 Hague Recucil 327, 358-59 (1931) (III); Bindschedler, supra note 21, at
186-207.
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upon the full compensation rule with all of its ramifications, 'secure
in the knowledge that a taking of their property without prompt, ade-
quate, and effective payment would be deemed confiscatory and would
give grounds for a claim for reparation.
D. The Form of Reparation
Claims based upon the taking of alien property in contravention
of the foregoing rules of law have generally been settled by awards of
monetary damages.
The De Sabla claim44 is typical of the cases decided by inter-
national arbitration, which prescribe that in the absence of a violation
of a treaty obligation, money damages are the proper form of repara-
tion for the seizure of alien property without compensation. This claim
was decided by the United States-Panama General Claims' . Commis-
sion established in pursuance of the General Claims Convention of
July 28, 1926" and the Supplemental Convention of December 17,
1932."
The claim involved a request for damages by the owner of a
tract of land in Panama. The claimant, a United States national,
averred that officials of the Panamanian Government, with knowledge
that the land was the private property of the claimant, treated the
land as public property and, between the years 1910 and 1930, made
grants of it to private individuals.
The Commission found that the PanaManian land laws exempted
private property from such treatment, and that the officials were
aware that the property in question was private. Hence Panama was
internationally responsible. The Commission said:
It is axiomatic that acts of a government in depriving an alien
of his property without compensation impose international
responsibility. . . . It is no extreme measure to hold, as this
Commission does, that if the process of working out the
system results in the loss of the private property of aliens,
such loss should be compensated.47 -
The Commission, therefore, found for the claimant and, exercising
the power given to it by the Convention to grant monetary compen-
sation," it awarded damages of $76,646.25 for the losses due to the
unlawful grants."
44 United States v. Panama, supra note 35.
4n 47 Stat. 1915, T.S. No. 842.
46 48 Stat. 1485, T.S. No. 860.
47 United States v. Panama, supra note 35, at 366.
48 See arts. V and VIII of the Convention, 47 Stat. 1915, T.S. No. 842.
49 A similar award was made in the Walter Fletcher Smith case, an arbitration
between Cuba and the United States, supra note 26.
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A study of international arbitrations also discloses that money
damages is the remedy prescribed by customary international law for
the discriminatory taking of alien property.
The Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Norway v. United States)
case," mentioned previously, involved a claim by Norwegian ship-
owners for reparation for the seizure, without payment, of their con-
tracts • for the construction of merchant ships in American shipyards,
by the United States Government during World War I. Discrimination
was one aspect, of the claim which bad to be reckoned with, and in
that connection the Tribunal of Arbitration said:
The United States are responsible for having thus made
a discriminating use of the power of eminent domain towards
citizens of a friendly nation, and they are liable for the
damaging action of their officials and agents towards these
citizens of the Kingdom of Norway.'
The tribunal awarded monetary compensation to the Norwegian
Government with respect to the losses sustained by the Norwegian
owners," on October 13, 1922.
With regard to claims based upon the violation of the public
purpose rule, the cases indicate reparation in the form of a cash
settlement."
Recently, publicists like Wortley," Schwarzenberger" and Rolin"
have suggested that restitution in kind, not monetary damages, is
the primary form of reparation for the discriminatory, uncompensated
taking of alien property, when the seizure does not also contravene
treaty obligations. Some decisions of national courts seem to support
this opinion.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jafirate (The Rose Mary), decided by
the Supreme Court of Aden on January 9, 1953, is a case in point.'
In 1952, the ship Rose Mary, flying the flag of Honduras, arrived in
Aden harbor with a cargo of oil taken on in Iran. The oil in question
had been produced by plants established by the plaintiff company in
50 Supra note 26.
54 Id. at 339.
52 Id. at 340-41. The following international arbitral decisions also awarded mone-
tary damages for the discriminatory taking of alien property: El Triunfo Case (United
States v. El Salvador) (1902), Foreign Rel. U.S. 838-48, 857-73 (1903); Delagoa Bay
Railway Case, 2 Moore, International Arbitrations 1865-99 (1898).
33 See, e.g., the George Finlay case, 39 Br. & For. St. Paps. 906.
34 Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law 128-29 (1959).
55 1 Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals 657 (3d ed. 1957).
Rolin, Avis sur la Validite des Mesures de Nationalisation Decretees par le
Gouvernement Indonesian, 6 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 260, 268, 269, 271 (1959).
57 I Aden L.A. 46 (1953),
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Iran, under its concession agreement of 1933 with the Iranian Govern-
ment. In 1951, the latter government had enacted an Oil Nationaliza-
tion Law, which purported to expropriate all the property vested in
the plaintiff company by the 1933 concession, and since that time it
had been selling oil as its own property.
The plaintiff brought an action in detinue requesting delivery
of the oil. The court ruled that the Nationalization Law of 1951 was
invalid under international law, since the company's property had
been expropriated without compensation. The oil in question, there-
fore, had remained the property of the company, and it was entitled
to restitution.
The court expressed the rationale for its decision in the following
words:
The plaintiffs' contention can be based on two grounds. In
the first place, that no State can be expected to give effect
within its territorial jurisdiction to a foreign law that is con-
trary to its own public policy or essential principles of moral-
ity. Secondly, that a foreign law that is contrary to inter-
national law or in flagrant violation of international comity
need not be regarded."
The Supreme Court of Aden, then, decreed restitution on the
ground that a foreign /ex situs, contrary to international law and,
hence, contrary to its concept of public policy, need not be given
effect within its jurisdiction. It seems quite clear, therefore, that the
result reached in The Rose Mary reflects the application of a conflict
of laws rule rather than the application of a rule of public international
law. This conclusion is borne out by the contrary decisions reached by
courts in Italy and Japan with regard to actions brought by this same
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Societa Petrolifera Orientale (The
Miriella), the Civil Tribunal of Venice, on March 11, 1953, refused to
decree restitution of a shipment of oil." The Venetian court, in its
decision, viewed this controversy as one to be decided by conflict of
laws principles. Since the oil had been in Iran at the time of the expro-
priation, Iranian law, the lex rd sitae, was the proper one to determine
the question of ownership. Furthermore, the legal effects of the Iranian
law could not be rendered ineffective in Italy on public policy grounds,
for the Nationalization Law sufficiently provided for compensation,
as required by Italian public policy for the expropriation of the pri-
vate property of foreign nationals. The Civil Court of Rome took the
same approach in deciding a similar case against the company, on
58 Id. at 53.
59 Lauterpacht, International Law Reports, 1955, 19.
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September 13, 1954, in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Societa Petrolifera
Orientate."
In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha,
the District Court of Tokyo, in 1953, also ruled that the Iranian
Nationalization Law did not violate Japanese public policy and that
there had been no confiscation 61
These decisions of the courts of Aden, Italy, and Japan indicate
quite clearly that these cases were decided primarily in accordance
with conflict of laws rules, not by rules of public international law.
This fact, of course, is highly relevant in assessing their value as evi-
dence of an international law rule of restitution in expropriation cases
when property is not protected by treaty. It seems clear that these
cases do not qualify as such evidence.
The differing results reached in these cases are also worthy of
note. Since the settled practice of nations is a source of international
law, these conflicting decisions, as illustrative of the divergent practice
of national courts in the matter of restitution as reparation, indicate
that there is no international law rule of restitution in these circum-
stances. This lack of uniformity of practice proceeds from the contro-
versy concerning the so-called Act of State doctrine.
Under the Act of State doctrine the courts of one State refuse
to question the validity or legality of the official acts of another
sovereign State, in so far as these acts operate directly upon persons
or property within the territorial jurisdiction of the latter State. 62
The Act of State doctrine is not followed universally. Only
American and English courts follow it regularly.' French courts,
however, refuse to apply the Act of State doctrine, when foreign legis-
lation is viewed as being contrary to their conception of public policy.'"
43° Id. at 23.
61 Lauterpacht, International Law Reports, 1953, 305.
62 1 Oppenheim, International Law 267 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). See also, gen-
erally, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Int'l L., A Recon-
sideration of the Acl of State Doctrine in United States Courts (1959).
63 See, e.g., Octjen v. Central Leather Co,, 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (no action for
Mexican-owned hides seized in Mexico); Luther v. Sagor (1921), 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.) (no
action for wood owned by Russian corporation and seized in Russia). See also Wortley,
The General Principles of Private International Law, 94 Hague Recueil 91, 244 (1958)
(II); Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 635, 637
(1959); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. Intl L. 826 (1959).
The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that the Act of State doc-
trine is binding upon American courts. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964).
64 See, e.g., U.S.S.R. v. Compagnie Ropit, France, 1928, McNair & Lauterpacht,
Annual Dig., 1927-1928, Case No. 43 (refusal to give effect to Russian decree nationaliz-
ing Russian ships in Russia); Moulin v. Volatron, France, 1937, Lauterpacht, Annual
Dig., 1935-1937, Case No. 68 (refusal to recognize the expropriation of a company
registered in Spain by the Catalonian Government during the Spanish Civil War). See
also Wortley, supra note 54, at 17-18.
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German courts, too, have refused to recognize the validity of
foreign Acts of State, when the latter violated German public policy."
The German courts, however, have not been consistent in this matter.
In N. V. V erenigde Deli-Afaatschappijen and N. V. Senembah-Maat-
schappij v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H.,
two Dutch companies, whose tobacco plantations in Indonesia had been
nationalized in 1958, claimed property rights in the tobacco harvest
of 1958, which had been shipped to a German company in Bremen,
Germany. The Dutch companies, alleging that the nationalization was
discriminatory and without compensation, asked for injunctive relief
on the grounds that the Indonesian Nationalization Act violated inter-
national law and that recognition of the Nationalization Act by
German courts would be contrary to German public policy." On
August 21, 1959, the Hanseatic Court of Appeals in Bremen dismissed
appeals from decisions of the District Court of Bremen which had
denied the injunctions requested by the Dutch companies, ruling that
the Indonesian Nationalization Act was entitled to recognition as a
foreign Act of State and that such recognition did not violate German
public poIicy.67
Part of the nationalized 1958 tobacco harvest had also been sent
to Amsterdam, the Netherlands, where it was held by the Bank of
Indonesia. One of the expropriated Dutch companies sought restitu-
tion of the tobacco. The Appellate Court of Amsterdam, affirming the
decision of the District Court of Amsterdam, delivered the tobacco
to the Dutch company, in N. V. Senembah Maatschappij v. Republiek
Indonesie Bank Indonesia and N. V. De Twentsche Bank, on June 4,
1959. The court ruled that, although Dutch courts generally refrained
from challenging foreign Acts of State, the Indonesian Nationalization
Act would not be recognized because its discriminatory treatment of
Dutch interests and its failure to provide for compensation were ad-
verse to Dutch public policy."
65 Expropriation (Soviet Zone of Germany) case, Germany (American Zone), 1949,
Lauterpacht, Annual Dig., 1949, Case No. 10 (refusal to recognize the expropriation
without compensation of a firm in the Soviet zone); Expropriation of Insurance Com-
panies case, Germany (West Berlin), 1950, Lauterpacht, International Law Reports,
1951, Case No. 43 (refusal to recognize the expropriation without compensation of an
insurance company in the Soviet zone).
66 28 International Law Reports 16 (1963).
07 Id. at 25-39.
68 See Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts, 54 Am.
J. Int'l L. 305, 307-08, 315-16, 318-20 (1960), for an analysis of this case before the
Dutch court. Domke concludes his analysis with the statement that while the decisions
of the Dutch courts correspond with the concept of non-recognition of foreign con-
fiscatory decrees which still prevails in Western countries, the German courts in "aban-
doning" the prevailing view do not submit convincing reasons for "changing the well-
established principles of international law." Id. at 323.
Baade takes issue with Domke's statement. He argues that the decisions of the Ger-
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As is evident, the national courts of the different States, including
those in the Common Market, take opposing positions with regard
to the application of the Act of State doctrine. At the present time,
various publicists are urging that the doctrine be abandoned, particu-
larly in the United States" and in the United Kingdom" where the
doctrine has been followed regularly. It is urged particularly that
municipal courts afford, on many occasions, the only means for accord-
ing respect to property rights. Be that as it may, the controversy con-
cerning the Act of State doctrine continues, and, with it, the divergent
practice of national courts in the availability of restitution as repara-
tion for the wrongful taking of alien property.
It is submitted, therefore, that cases like The Rase Mary do not
point to an international law rule of restitution for the illegal expropria-
tion of alien property. Customary international law sanctions repara-
tion by cash settlement only, when the wrongful taking does not involve
a treaty violation. This, then, is the means of reparation upon which
American nationals can rely if their foreign business operations are
damaged by discriminatory, uncompensated takings by host States.
IV. BREACH OF CONTRACT BY HOST STATE
As has been seen, the pacta sunt servanda principle binds a State
to carry out its treaty obligations with regard to alien property inter-
ests. The question now is whether this same rule should also be applied
to contractual agreements between States and aliens. International
investment and trade, in great measure, are carried on by means of
contracts and concession agreements between States and foreigners.
And the latter, like the parties to any agreement, have the right to
expect the performance of the contracts which they conclude with
foreign governments. When a State-contractor, therefore, by an
arbitrary exercise of its sovereign power, defeats that expectation of
performance, it impedes the development of the mutual trust so neces-
sary for expanding world trade. Quite clearly, much could be done
to rectify this unfortunate situation by applying the pacta sunt ser-
vanda rule to contractual agreements between States and aliens. But
man courts, refusing to disregard the effectiveness of Indonesian expropriation decrees
as against the property of Dutch nationals, are in accord not only with well-established
principles of international law, but also with the concept of recognition of foreign con-
fiscatory decrees which prevails in most States, including the Western countries. Baade,
Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts—A Reply, 54 Am. J. Int'l
L. 801 (1960).
00 See the proposals of the Committee on International Law of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 62, and Hyde, supra note 63. These
proposals, however, have been challenged by Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the
Rule of Law—A Reply, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 141 (1960).
70 See Wortley, supra note 63, at 211-13.
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does international practice warrant this extension of the pacta suet
servanda principle?
While the proposition that a State must observe treaty restrictions
upon the taking of alien property interests is unopposed, the legal
force of restrictions upon the expropriation of foreign property, found
in contractual agreements between States and aliens, is a disputed
point of international law. The traditional position has been that the
breach by a State of a contract with an alien does not, of itself, engage
that State's international responsibility.
If the violation of the contract has been "arbitrary" or "tortious"
then a violation of international Iaw occurs, and the question of the
State's international responsibility arises. This is on the ground of the
commission of an international tort, and not because of the breach
of the contract.
This traditional rule with regard to a State's breach of its contract
with an alien is exemplified by the practice of the United States Gov-
ernment. With regard to claims for non-tortious breaches of contract,
Moore states that "it is not usual for the government of the United
States to interfere, except by its good offices, for the prosecution of
claims founded on contracts with foreign governments."' The reason
is, of course, that such a contract violation does not contravene inter-
national law. Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, states this clearly in his
letter to Mr. Bispham on June 24, 1885, as follows:
If the sovereign appealed to denies the validity of the
claim or refuses its payment, the matter drops, since it is
not consistent with the dignity of the United States to press,
after such a refusal or denial, a contractual claim for the
repudiation of which, by the law of nations, there is no
redress. 72
The situation is different, however, when the foreign government
arbitrarily annuls its contract with an American national. Such was the
case when the United States Government intervened in behalf of the
Intercontinental Telephone Company, a New Jersey corporation, which
was doing business in Venezuela. The corporation, for a valuable
consideration, had been granted certain rights by the Venezuelan
Government. Subsequently, the corporation's rights were nullified by
an arbitrary executive order in violation of the contract. In instructing
Mr. Scott, the Minister to Venezuela, to press the corporation's claim
against that Government, Mr. Bayard, the Secretary of State, wrote
on August 12, 1887, as follows:
71 6 Moore, Digest of International Law 705 (1906).
72 Id. at 716.
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I observe . . . that in one part of your note to Dr.
Seijas, you speak of the case as one of violation of contract,
though you subsequently very properly rest the claim on
tort. The case is indeed one of violation of contract, but
it is not on the contract, for the purpose of obtaining either
its fulfilment or damages for its non-fulfilment, that this
Government now proceeds. The case is one of arbitrary
confiscation and spoliation of the rights and property of
citizens of the United States who acquired these rights and
this property in Venezuela, under the express sanction of
its Government and the most solemn guarantees of its
protection. You are therefore instructed to renew the claim
in this specific shape to that Government, and to say that
the Government of the United States insists upon such action
being taken by that Government as will . . . compensate the
claimants for the wrong done them . . .
The United States would also press the contractual claims of
its nationals against foreign powers, if American nationals were
unduly discriminated against by a debtor government or denied a
domestic judicial remedy against it."
Notwithstanding this traditional international practice with re-
gard to a State's breach of its contract with an alien, some authorities
currently advocate the direct application of the pacta sunt servanda
rule to contractual agreements between States and foreigners. In this
view, a State which repudiates its contractual obligations is guilty
of a violation of international law, ipso facto.
Since a taking of alien property in breach of a State's con-
tractual obligations is, it is argued, wrongful, the reparation due for
such a taking must, on the authority of the ChorzOw Factory case,
go beyond the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation. The ChorzOw Factory case stated that restitution in kind,
if possible, is the proper reparation for an act in violation of inter-
national law; it follows, therefore, that a State should make restitu-
tion in kind, through specific performance, of alien property taken in
contravention of contractual rights. The State may respond in mone-
tary damages only where restitution is impossible. 75
It must be stated that no conclusive evidence from international
law sources exists which supports the position that the pacta sunt
servanda principle applies directly to contracts concluded between
73 Id. at 724-25.
74 Id. at 725-27.
75 See Report of the 1958 Conference of the International Law Association 150-51
(1959) ; 1959 Proc. Am. Soc'y Intl L. 266-73 (1959).
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a Stateand foreigners, however much this view appeals to logic and
a sense of justice." • Nevertheless, there are many indicia of the
position favoring such an application of that rule.
In the Award of the Tribunal in the 'Arbitration between Saudi
Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), dated
August 23, 1958, it is stated as follows:
The Government has laid much stress upon the principle
of restrictive interpretation when, as is the case here, a
State is a party to the contract, and in particular when the
contract is a concession .. .. The Government relies on a
considerable number of judicial decisions of international
tribunals and of international arbitral awards, as well as on
decisions given by the Courts of the United States. . . .
The Arbitration Tribunal cannot accept the contention
that, for the sole reason that a State is a party to a contract
with a private person, the rights of the latter must be inter-
preted restrictively. In its opinion, the rights of the Parties
must be evaluated and examined in a spirit of complete
equality. . .. The restrictions of its powers, which a State
accepts by contract, are a manifestation of its sovereignty and
States are bound to fulfill their obligations to the same extent
as private persons.. .
In its capacity as first concessionaire, Aramco enjoys
indeed exclusive rights which have the character of acquired
or "vested" rights and which cannot be taken from it by
the Government by means of a contract concluded with a
second concessionaire, even if that contract were equal to
its own contract from a legal point of view. The principle
of respect for acquired rights is one of the fundamental
principles both of public international law and of the mu-
nicipal law of most civilized States. . . .
[V]alid contracts bind both parties and must be per-
formed, for rights resulting from agreements concluded for
due consideration are absolutely secure; when one party
has granted certain rights to the other contracting party,
it can no longer dispose of the same rights, totally or par-
tially, in favour of another party."
It should be noted, too, that various attempts at codification
of the law of nations governing the treatment of alien property
76 Hyde, Economic Development Agreements, 105 Hague Recueil 271, 312-24 (1962)
(I).
77 27 International Law Reports 117, 190-92, 205, 206 (1963). See also Radio Corp.
of America v. Nat'l Government of the Republic of China, 30 Am. J. Intl L. 535 (1936).
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rights, have judged the breach of a contract between a State and an
alien to be a violation of international law.
The Preparatory Committee of the Conference for the Codifi-
cation of International Law, the Hague, 1930, addressed a question,
on this subject, to the governments of the States participating in the
Conference. The query was whether a State becomes responsible for
enacting legislation incompatible with the terms of concessions or
contracts granted to or concluded with foreigners. Twenty-three gov-
ernments replied to the question, and the Committee stated its find-
ings in the following observation:
The prevalent opinion is that a State renders itself
internationally responsible if it enacts legislation incompat-
ible with a concession which it has granted to, or a con-
tract which it has made with a foreigner. 78
.	 Acting on these findings, the Committee formulated "Basis of
Discussion No. 3" as follows:
A State is responsible for damage suffered by a for-
eigner as the result of the enactment of legislation which
directly infringes rights derived by the foreigner from a
concession granted or a contract made by the State."
Although the Hague Conference did not act upon the Prepara-
tory Committee's formulation, the latter gives support to the posi-
tion which states that the violation, through legislation, of alien con-
tractual rights by a State, of itself, is a breach of international law.
Municipal law decisions also give weight to the view that States,
no less than individuals, are bound by their contracts. The United
States Supreme Court stated this most emphatically, when it con-
demned the federal government's repudiation of the gold clause in
the redemption of government bonds, in Perry v. United States." By
virtue of its power to borrow money, the Court ruled, Congress is
authorized to pledge the credit of the United States as assurance of
the stipulated payment, "as the highest assurance the Government
can give, its plighted faith." 8' To say that Congress can repudiate
that pledge, the Court continued, is to assume that the Constitution
was considering a vain promise; this Court has never sanctioned
such a conception of the Government's obligations.
78 24 Am. J. Intl L. Supp. 49 (1930).
7 ' Id. at 50. See also the Harvard Research in International Law, The Law of
Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property
of Foreigners, 23 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 167-68 (1929).
80 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
81 Id. at 351.
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When the United States, with constitutional authority,
makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilies sim-
ilar to those of individuals who are parties to such instru-
ments.
It can be plausibly argued, therefore, that the pasta sunt ser-
vanda principle should be applied directly to violations of contracts
between States and aliens, just as it is invoked when a State's inter-
ference with alien property rights contravenes a treaty. And it has
to be admitted, too, that the extension of this rule to include contracts
would reduce the number of "nationalizations" which have inordi-
nately strained international peace and order in recent years. It is sub-
mitted, however, on weighing the evidence, that international law,
de lege lata, does not encompass State-alien contracts within the
purview of the pasta sunt servanda principle."
It follows, of course, from the foregoing submission, that inter-
national Iaw does not prescribe specific performance of a State as
reparation for the taking of alien property in violation of a con-
tractual obligation.
A State, therefore, is internationally responsible for breach of
its contract with an alien, only if the contract violation has been
"arbitrary" or "tortious." In this case, such international arbitrations
as the El Triunfo Case (United States v. El Salvador)," the Delagoa
Bay Railway Case (United States and Great Britain v. Portugal),"
the May Claim (United States v. Guatemala)," the Cheek Claim
82 Id. at 352. See also the Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1879), where the Court
ruled as follows:
The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If
they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong
and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a
State or a municipality or a citizen.
Id. at 719. Evidence from other nations is cited by Mann, The Law Governing State
Contracts, 21 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 11, 13-14 n.10 (1944).
83 Learned opinion and practice are agreed that non-performance of State-alien
contracts does not, per se, constitute an international wrong. International claims, in-
volving contracts, can only relate to issues of their arbitrary or tortious violation. U.N.
International Law Comm'n, Report: International Responsibility, 9th Sess,, at 36-41
{Doc. No. A/CN.4/106) (1957). Mann makes the same point in his recent considera-
tion of the problem. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 Am. J. Int'l L.
572 (1960).
Two recent studies, the proposed official draft American Law Institute Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and the proposed Harvard Law
School draft convention, reach the same condusion. See Restatement, Foreign Relations
Law of the United States #198, comments b, c, d (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ; Sohn
& Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55
Am. J. Intl L. 545, 566-75 (1961).
84 (1902) Foreign Rel. U.S. 838-48, 857-73 (1903).
86
 2 Moore, International Arbitrations 1865 (1898) ; (1900) Foreign.Rel. U.S. 903-04
(1902).
86 6 Moore, supra note 71, at 730-31.
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(United States v. Siam)," and the Landreau Claim (United States
v. Peru)" indicate that customary international law requires the
payment of monetary damages as the proper form of reparation.
This is the current state of the law in the Common Market nations.
V. CONCLUSION
In the foregoing summary of existing customary international
law the emphasis has been upon the substantive rules which protect
the foreign investor. There is no intention, of course, of denying
the applicability of the so-called procedural rules pertaining to the
theory and practice of international claims law, such as the local
remedies and nationality requirements. Under generally accepted
international practice, no State can put forward a claim for injury
sustained by one of its own nationals, unless that national has ex-
hausted the remedies available to him under the municipal law of
the country allegedly responsible for the injury." Any detailed con-
sideration of these "procedural" rules is, however, beyond the scope
of this article.
Some appraisals of the protection of private foreign property
given by customary international law find that the latter is deficient
from the standpoint of protection." Admittedly, there are short-
comings but, as the writer has attempted to point out, they generally
appear when the receiving State is an underdeveloped country.
To American law the principles of pacta sunt servanda, non-
discrimination, public purpose, and full compensation, are rudi-
mentary. They are also basic to the legal systems of the Common
Market nations which, like the United States, promote free enter-
prise. These same principles have received, in these countries, strong
affirmation as the basic rules of customary international law with
respect to State responsibility for economic injuries to aliens. Viola-
tions of these legal principles require reparation by restitution in
kind, when the taking contravenes a treaty, and by monetary damages
in all other cases. It is submitted, therefore, that this international
agreement on fundamental concepts of fair play to private investors
gives substantial protection to American private property in the Com-
mon Market.
87 2 Moore, International Arbitrations 1899 (1898).
88 1 U.N.R.LA.A. 347 (1948).
89 See Bishop, International Law 704-37 (2d ed. 1962).
90 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 40, at 608-09.
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